This document details the background, content, and our comments regarding the initiative to reform the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (“CPEUM”) concerning the Judiciary.
I. Background
II. Content of the Reform and our comments
A. Popular election of judges
The Reform establishes that the justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation ("SCJN"), magistrates, and district judges of the Federal Judiciary, as well as the magistrates of the Electoral Tribunal and the magistrates and judges of the state judicial branches, will be elected by popular vote.
The selection process includes the publication of announcements by the Senate, the nomination of candidates by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, and the formation of Evaluation Committees, which will prepare a list of candidates to be narrowed down through a draw. The National Electoral Institute will organize the elections and publish the results.
Public or private financing of campaigns is prohibited, which will last 60 days. The elections of state judges and magistrates will be regulated by state laws.
We expect that secondary legislation will elaborate on the eligibility requirements for judges, to ensure their autonomy and quality.
B. Creation of a judicial administration body and a Judicial Discipline Tribunal
The Reform provides for the creation of a Judicial Discipline Tribunal (“TDJ”) responsible for investigating and sanctioning judges for conduct contrary to the law, the administration of justice, or the principles of objectivity, impartiality, independence, professionalism, or excellence.
Additionally, the TDJ will evaluate the performance of the already elected district magistrates and judges and order corrective measures if their evaluation is unfavorable.
The sanctions that the TDJ can impose include warnings, suspensions, financial penalties, dismissal, and disqualification of judges, except for SCJN justices and electoral magistrates, who can only be removed through impeachment.
The Reform also provides for the creation of a judicial administration body responsible for the administration and career development of the Judiciary. It will be composed of five persons, who will serve a single six-year term. One member will be appointed by the Executive, one by the Senate, and three by the SCJN plenary.
It is essential that secondary legislation precisely regulates the reasons for which a judge could be sanctioned by the TDJ to avoid subjective application of sanctions.
C. Modifications to the functioning of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
The Reform provides that the SCJN will be composed of 9 justices elected by popular vote (currently 11) and will function only in plenary (the two current chambers will be eliminated).
General declarations of unconstitutionality must be approved by a majority of at least 6 votes.
It is likely that reducing the number of justices and eliminating the chambers will significantly delay case resolutions, as most of the cases under SCJN jurisdiction are currently resolved by the chambers. It is important for secondary legislation to define which cases could be resolved by Regional Plenaries or Collegiate Tribunals to avoid delays in the administration of justice.
D. Six-month deadline for resolving certain tax cases
The Reform establishes that secondary laws will provide for the amounts and circumstances of tax matters in which administrative tribunals, as well as judges and magistrates of the Judiciary, must resolve cases within a maximum of six months. If the deadline is not met, the jurisdictional body hearing the case must notify the TDJ or its internal control body and justify the delay.
It will be important for secondary legislation to detail the tax matters subject to this time limit and provide certain exceptions to avoid hasty rulings without a thorough analysis. Furthermore, secondary legislation should provide mechanisms for jurisdictional bodies to have the infrastructure and human capital to meet these deadlines.
E. Limitation of the effects of rulings
The Reform provides that rulings issued in amparo proceedings may, in no case, have general effects and should only concern the individuals who initiated the proceeding. Similarly, the Reform stipulates that in amparo proceedings, suspensions may, in no case, be granted with general effects.
Likewise, the Reform provides that in the case of constitutional controversies or actions of unconstitutionality, their admission will not, in any case, result in the suspension of the challenged law. This means that the law deemed unconstitutional will continue to apply until the constitutional remedy is definitively resolved.
F. Transitory provisions
The transitory provisions of the Reform stipulate that it will enter into force the day after its publication in the Official Gazette of the Federation.
An extraordinary election is expected in 2025 to elect all SCJN justices, vacant seats in the Electoral Tribunal, TDJ members, and half of the judges and magistrates of the federal judiciary. The remaining judges and magistrates will be elected in the regular 2027 election.
The Union Congress will have 90 calendar days from the entry into force of the Reform to make the necessary adjustments to the relevant federal laws. In turn, the states will have 180 calendar days to make adjustments to their local constitutions, and the renewal of magistrates and judges' positions must be completed by 2027.
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